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Summary
This paper adapts Turing analysis and applies it to dynamic bioeconomic problems
where the interaction of coupled economic and ecological dynamics over space
endogenously creates (or destroys) spatial heterogeneity. It also extends Turing analysis
to standard recursive optimal control frameworks in economic analysis and applies it to
dynamic bioeconomic problems where the interaction of coupled economic and
ecological dynamics under optimal control over space creates a challenge to analytical
tractability. We show how an appropriate formulation of the problem reduces analysis
to a tractable extension of linearization methods applied to the spatial analog of the well
known costate/state dynamics. We illustrate the usefulness of our methods on
bioeconomic applications, but the methods have more general economic applications
where spatial considerations are important. We believe that the extension of Turing
analysis and the theory associated with dispersion relationship to recursive infinite
horizon optimal control settings is new.
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In economics the importance of space has long been recognized in the context of location
theory,1 although as noted by Paul Krugman (1998) there has been neglect in a systematic
analysis of spatial economics, associated mainly with diﬃculties in developing tractable mod-
els of imperfect competition which are essential in the analysis of location patterns. After
the early 1990’s there was a renewed interest in spatial economics mainly in the context of
new economic geography,2 which concentrates on issues such as the determinants of regional
growth and regional interactions, or the location and size of cities (e.g. Paul Krugman, 1993).
In environmental and resource management problems the majority of the analysis has
been concentrated on taking into account the temporal variation of the phenomena, and
has been focused on issues such as the transition dynamics towards a steady state, or the
steady-state stability characteristics. However, it is clear that when renewable and especially
biological resources are analyzed, the spatial variation of the phenomenon is also impor-
tant. Biological resources tend to disperse in space under forces promoting "spreading",
or "concentrating" (Akira Okubo, 2001); these processes along with intra and inter species
interactions induce the formation of spatial patterns for species. In the management of
economic-ecological problems, the importance of introducing the spatial dimension can be
associated with a few attempts to incorporate spatial issues, such as resource management
in patchy environments (James Sanchirico and James Wilen 1999, 2001; Sanchirico, 2004;
William Brock and Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2002), the study of control models for interacting
species (Suzanne Lenhart and Mahadev Bhat (1992), Lenhart et al. 1999) or the control of
1 See for example Alfred Weber (1909), Harold Hotelling (1929), Walter Christaller (1933), and August
Löcsh (1940) for early analysis.
2 Paul Krugman (1998) attributes this new research to: the ability to model monopolistic competition
using the well known model of Avinash Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz (1977); the proper modeling of transaction
costs; the use of evolutionary game theory; and the use of computers for numerical examples.
1surface contamination in water bodies (Bhat et al. 1999)
In the economic-ecological context, a central issue that this paper is trying to explore, is
under what conditions interacting processes characterizing movements of biological resources,
and economic variables which reﬂect human eﬀects on the resource (e.g. harvesting eﬀort)
could generate steady-state spatial patterns for the resource and the economic variables. That
is, a steady-state concentration of the resource and the economic variable which is diﬀerent
at diﬀerent points in a given spatial domain. We will call this formation of spatial patterns
spatial heterogeneity, in contrast to spatial homogeneity which implies that the steady state
concentration of the resource and the economic variable is the same at all points in a given
spatial domain.3
A central concept in modelling the dispersal of biological resources is that of diﬀusion.
Diﬀusion is deﬁned as a process where the microscopic irregular movement of particles such
as cells, bacteria, chemicals, or animals results in some macroscopic regular motion of the
group (Okubo and Simon Levin, 2001; James Murray, 1993, 2003). Biological diﬀusion
is based on random walk models, which when coupled with population growth equations,
leads to general reaction-diﬀusion systems.4 In general a diﬀusion process in an ecosystem
tends to produce a uniform population density, that is spatial homogeneity. Thus it might
be expected that diﬀusion would "stabilize" ecosystems where species disperse and humans
intervene through harvesting.
There is however one exception known as diﬀusion induced instability,o rdiﬀusive in-
stability (Okubo et al., 2001). It was Alan Turing (1952) who suggested that under certain
conditions reaction-diﬀusion systems can generate spatially heterogeneous patterns. This is
3 All dynamic models where spatial characteristics and dispersal are ignored leads to spatial homogeneity.
4 When only one species is examined the coupling of classical diﬀusion with a logistic growth function
leads to the so-called Fisher-Kolmogorov equation.
2the so-called Turing mechanism for generating diﬀusion instability.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of the Turing mechanism in the emer-
gence of diﬀusive instability in uniﬁed economic/ecological models of resource management.
This is a diﬀerent approach to the one most commonly used to address spatial issues, which
is the use of metapopulation models in discrete patchy environments with dispersal among
patches. We believe that the use of the Turing mechanism allows us to analyze in detail
conditions under which diﬀusion could produce spatial heterogeneity and generation of spa-
tial patterns, or spatial homogeneity. Thus the Turing mechanism can be used to uncover
conditions which generate spatial heterogeneity in models where ecological variables interact
with economic variables. When spatial heterogeneity emerges the concentration of variables
of interest (e.g. resource stock and level of harvesting eﬀort), in a steady state, are diﬀerent
in diﬀerent locations of a given spatial domain. Once the mechanism is uncovered the impact
of regulation in promoting or eliminating spatial heterogeneity can also be analyzed.
The importance of the Turing mechanism in spatial economics has been recognized by
Masahisa Fujita et al. (1999, chapter 6) in the analysis of core-periphery models. Our
analysis extends this approach mainly by: explicit modelling of diﬀusion processes governing
interacting economic and ecological state variables in continuous time space; deriving explicit
conditions depending on economic-ecological variables, under which diﬀusion could generate
spatial patterns, and probably more importantly by developing the ideas for the emergence of
spatial heterogeneity in an optimizing context by an appropriate modiﬁcation of Pontryagin’s
maximum principle.
In this context, ﬁrst we present a descriptive model where the biomass of a renewable
resource (e.g. ﬁsh) diﬀuses in a ﬁnite one-dimensional spatial domain, and harvesting eﬀort
diﬀuses in the same domain, attracted in locations where proﬁts per boat are higher. We
3examine conditions under which: (i) open-access equilibrium generates traveling waves for the
resource biomass, and (ii) the Turing mechanism can induce spatial heterogeneity, in the sense
that the steady-state ﬁshing stock and ﬁshing eﬀort are diﬀerent at diﬀerent points of the
spatial domain. We also show how regulation can promote or eliminate spatial heterogeneity.
Second we consider the emergence of spatial heterogeneity in the context of an optimizing
model, where the objective of a social planner is to maximize a welfare criterion subject to
resource dynamics that include a diﬀusion process. We present a suggestion for extending
Pontryagin’s maximum principle to the optimal control of diﬀusion. Although conditions
for the optimal control of partial diﬀerential equations have been derived either in abstract
settings (e.g. Jacques-Louis Lions 1971) or for speciﬁcp r o b l e m s , 5 our derivation, not only
makes the paper self contained, but it is also close to the optimal control formalism used
by economists, so it can be used for analyzing other types of economic problems, where
state variables are governed by diﬀusion processes. Furthermore, the Pontryagin principle
developed in this paper allows for an extension of the Turing mechanism for generation of
spatial patterns, to the optimal control of systems under diﬀusion.
A new, to our knowledge, characteristic of our continuous space-time approach is that we
are able to embed Turing analysis in an optimal control recursive inﬁnite horizon approach in
a way that allows us to locate suﬃcient conditions on parameters of the system (for example,
t h ed i s c o u n tr a t eo nt h ef u t u r e ,a n di n teraction terms in the dynamics) for diﬀusive insta-
bility to emerge even in systems that are being optimally controlled. This mathematically
challenging problem becomes tractible by exploiting the recursive structure of the utility and
the dynamics in our continuous space/time framework in contrast to the more traditional ap-
proach of discrete patch optimizing models. This is so because the symmetries in the spatial
5 See for example Lenhart and Bhat, (1992); Lenhart et al., (1999); Bhat et al., (1999); Jean-Pierre
Raymond and Housnaa.Zidani, (1998, 1999)
4structure coupled with the recursivity in the temporal structure of our framework reduce the
potentially very large number of state and costate variables to a pair of "suﬃcient" variables
t h a td e s c r i b et h ed y n a m i c so ft h ew h o l es y s t e m .W eb e l i e v et h a to u rf r a m e w o r kw i l lb eq u i t e
easily adaptable to other applications, including an extension of the classical Ramsey Solow
growth model to include spatial externalities. Colin Clark’s classic volume (1990) as well as
the work of Sanchirico and Wilen (1999, 2001) is very suggestive, but they do not contain
the uniﬁcation of Turing analysis with inﬁnite horizon temporally recursive optimal control
problems that we present here. We set the stage by analysis of some descriptive frameworks
before turning to optimal control counterparts
Here, we use our methodology to study an optimal ﬁshery management problem and
a bioinvasion problem under diﬀusion. For the ﬁshery problem, our results suggest that
diﬀusion could alter the usual saddle point characteristics of the spatially homogeneous
steady state as deﬁned by the modiﬁed Hamiltonian dynamic system. In an analogue to the
Turing mechanism for an optimizing system, spatial heterogeneity in a steady state could be
the result of optimal management. On the other hand diﬀusion could stabilize, in the saddle
point sense, an unstable steady state of an optimal control problem. For the bioinvasion
problem we develop a most rapid approach path (MRAP) solution to the optimal control of
diﬀusion processes with linear structure, and derive conditions under which it is optimal: to
ﬁght the invasion to the maximum when it ﬁrst occurs; to do nothing at all, or to attain a
spatially diﬀerentiated target biomass of the invasive species as rapidly as possible.
52D i ﬀusion and Spatial Heterogeneity in Descriptive Models
of Resource Management
2.1 Spatial Open Access Equilibrium with Resource Biomass Diﬀusion
We start by considering the case where resource biomass diﬀuses in a spatial domain and
harvesting takes place in an open access way. Let x(z,t) denote the concentration of the
biomass of a renewable resource (e.g. ﬁsh) at spatial point z ∈ Z, at time t. We assume
that biomass grows according to a standard growth function F (x) which determines the
resource’s kinetics but also disperses in space with a constant diﬀusion coeﬃcient Dx.6
∂x(z,t)
∂t
= F (x(z,t)) + Dx∇2x(z,t) (1)
Harvesting H (z,t) of the resource is determined as H (z,t)=qx(z,t)E (z,t), where E (z,t)
denotes the concentration of harvesting eﬀort (e.g. boats) at spatial point z and time t, and
q is catchability coeﬃcient. Assuming that the harvest is sold at a ﬁxed world price, proﬁts
accruing at location z are deﬁned as
pqx(z,t)E (z,t) − C (E (z,t)) (2)
where C (E (z,t)) is the total cost of applying eﬀort E (z,t) at location z. We assume that
eﬀort is attracted by proﬁts per boat and that eﬀort (boats) diﬀuses in the spatial domain
inﬁnitely fast so that proﬁts are equated in every site. Then in open access equilibrium with
boats allowed to enter from "outside", proﬁts are driven to zero at each site, or
pqxE − C (E)=0or (pqx − AC (E))E =0for all z (3)
6 In addition to standard notation we denote derivatives with respect to the spatial variable z, by ∇
dy =
∂dy
∂zd ,d =1 ,2.
6where AC (E) denotes average costs. Assuming linear increasing average cost or AC (E)=




> 0 if pqx − c0 > 0 (4)
¯ E (t,z)=0 otherwise (5)
Thus with harvesting, logistic growth F (x)=x(s − rx), 7 a n do p e na c c e s se q u i l i b r i u ma t
a l ls i t e s ,b i o m a s sd i ﬀuses according to the following Fisher-Kolmogorov equation:8
∂x
∂t






























If we introduce harvesting and open access equilibrium at all sites then biomass diﬀuses
according to the Fisher-Kolmogorov equation (7).9 Following Murray (1993), rescaling (7)
by writing t∗ = s
0






and omitting asterisks, we obtain
∂x
∂t
= x(1 − ax)+
∂2x
∂z2 (9)
with spatially homogeneous states 0 and 1/a, which are unstable and stable respectively. In





As shown by Murray (1993), (9) has a traveling wave solution which can be written as
x(z,t)=X (v),v= z − ct (11)
7 We write x instead of x(z,t) to simplify notation.
8 See Murray (1993 Chapter 11.2 page 277).
9 See Murray (1993, Chapter 11.2 page 277).
7where c is the speed of the wave. For a traveling wave to exist, the speed c must exceed
the minimum wave speed which under Kolmogorov initial conditions is determined for the
dimensional equation (7) by















The wave front solution is depicted in ﬁgure 1.
[Figure 1]
These results can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When biomass disperses in space according to (1), then open access har-
vesting, with harvesting eﬀort diﬀusing fast and resulting in zero proﬁt spatial equilibrium,
induces convergence to a traveling wave solution for the biomass X (v), with corresponding
eﬀort ¯ E (v)=
2(pqX(v)−c0)
c1 .
From (12) it can be seen that the wave speed depends on both ecological and economic pa-
rameters. In particular it is increasing in s, the catchability coeﬃcient q, the initial marginal
eﬀort cost c0, but declining in the slope of marginal eﬀort cost c1.
Our model can be used to analyze the impact of regulation. Assume that regulation
involves linear spatially homogeneous taxes on eﬀort (e.g. number or size of boats) or har-
vesting. Under an eﬀort tax, zero proﬁt condition and open access eﬀort become
pqxE − τE− C (E)=0 or [pqx − τ − AC (E)]E =0for all z, (13)
¯ E (t,z;τ)=
2(pqx(t,z) − c0 − τ)
c1
(14)
respectively. Under a linear spatially homogeneous harvesting tax they become
pqxE − τqEx− C (E)=0 or [(p − τ)qx− AC (E)]E =0for all z (15)
¯ E (t,z;τ)=
2[(p − τ)qx(t,z) − c0]
c1
(16)
8respectively. Given the above equations the eﬀects of regulation are obtained in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 A spatially homogeneous linear tax on eﬀort will increase the wave speed c,
and the equilibrium carrying capacity K, while a spatially homogeneous linear tax on harvest-
ing will increase the equilibrium carrying capacity K but leave the wave speed c unchanged.
For Proof see Appendix.
2.2 Biomass-Eﬀort Reaction Diﬀusion and Pattern Formation
In the previous section we assumed that in an unbounded spatial domain eﬀort diﬀuses fast
to dissipate proﬁts under open access across all sites. In this section we consider a bounded
spatial domain Z =[ 0 ,α] and we assume that eﬀort does not diﬀuse inﬁnitely fast in search
of proﬁts. This assumption allows us to study the interactions between biomass and eﬀort
diﬀusion and the generation of spatial patterns where biomass and eﬀort exhibit diﬀerent
concentrations.
We assume that eﬀort is attracted by proﬁts per boat and that eﬀort (boats) disperses
in the spatial domain with a constant diﬀusion coeﬃcient DE. Although boats could move
fast in open access property regimes, movements could be restricted in communal property
regimes (e.g. Fikret Berkes 1996), where due to institutional arrangements, there is exclusion
of boats from certain areas and general frictions in the movement of boats towards the
biomass. The structure of the model implies that the movement of biomass and eﬀort in
time and space can be described by the following reaction diﬀusion system
∂x
∂t
= x(s − rx) − qEx+ Dx∇2x (17)
∂E
∂t
= δE(pqx − AC (E)) + DE∇2E,δ>0 (18)
x(z,0),E (z,0) given, ∇x = ∇E =0for z =0 ,α (19)
where AC (E) is the average cost curve, assumed to be U-shaped. By (19) it is assumed
9that there is no external biomass or eﬀort input on the boundary of the spatial domain.10
Given the system of (17) and (18) we examine conditions under which the Turing mechanism
induces diﬀusive driven instability and creates a heterogeneous spatial pattern of resource
biomass and harvesting eﬀort.
2.2.1 Biomass-Eﬀort Spatial Patterns
In analyzing diﬀusion induced instability we start from a system which, in the absence of
diﬀusion, exhibits stable spatially homogeneous steady states. The spatially homogeneous
system of (17) and (18), with Dx = DE =0is deﬁned as:
˙ x = x(s − rx) − qEx (20)
˙ E = δE(pqx − AC (E)) ,δ>0 (21)
where a steady state (x∗,E∗) > 0 for the spatial homogeneous is determined as the solution












where (23) is linear with a negative slope, while (23) is U-shaped with E0 =a r gm i nAC (E)
being the eﬀort minimizing average cost. Assume that two steady states E∗
1 and E∗
2 exist.






1) < 0,A C
0
(E∗
2) ≷ 0. (24)
Furthermore, as indicated by the ﬂows of the phase diagram, the high eﬀort steady state is
stable while the low eﬀort is unstable.
10 This is a zero ﬂux boundary conditions which is imposed so that the organizing pattern between biomass
and eﬀo r ti se m e r g i n ga sar e s u l to ft h e i ri n t e r a c t i o n s ,i ss e l f-organizing and not driven by boundary conditions
(Murray 2003, Vol II, p.82).
10[Figure 2]
Linearizing around a steady state (x∗,E∗),11 the linearized spatial homogeneous system
can be written as












































If the stable steady state is at the increasing part of the average cost then a11a22 > 0,
while a12a21 < 0. If the stable steady state is at the decreasing part of the average cost then
a11a22 < 0,a 12a21 < 0. Since for diﬀusive instability we require opposite signs between a11and
a22 and between a12 and a21, 12 we consider the high eﬀort steady state occurring at the
declining part of AC (E). In this case the sign pattern for J is (a11,a 12) < 0, (a21,a 22) > 0.
Linearizing the full system (17) and (18) we obtain


















Following Murray (2003) we consider the time-independent solution of the spatial eigen-
value problem
∇2W + k2W =0, ∇W = 0,for z =0 ,a (27)
11 We follow Murray (2003, Vol II, Ch. 2.3).
12 Okubo et al., (2001, pp. 350-351).
11where k is the eigenvalue. For the one-dimensional domain [0,a] we have solutions for (27)





,n = ±1, ± 2,..., (28)
where An are arbitrary constants. Solution (28) satisﬁes the zero ﬂux condition at z =0
and z = a. The eigenvalue is k = nπ/a and 1/k = a/nπ is a measure of the wave like
pattern. The eigenvalue k is called the wavenumber and 1/k is proportional to the wavelength
ω : ω =2 π/k =2 α/n. Let Wk (z) be the eigenfunction corresponding to the wavenumber k,





Substituting (29) into (26), using (27) and canceling eλt we obtain for each k or equivalently
each n,λWk = JWk−Dk2Wk. Since we require non trivial solutions for Wk,λis determined
by
¯ ¯λI − J − Dk2¯ ¯ =0
Then the eigenvalue λ(k) as a function of the wavenumber is obtained as the roots of
λ2 +
£









= DxDEk4 − (Dxa22 + DEa11)k2 + Det(J) (31)





0. For the steady state to be unstable in spatial disturbances it is required that Reλ(k) > 0
for some k 6=0 . But Reλ
¡
k2¢
> 0 only if h
¡
k2¢





c obtained after diﬀerentiating (31) as k2
m =
(Dxa22+DEa11)
2DxDE which implies that for diﬀusive





< 0.The ﬁnal condition for diﬀusive instability becomes (Okubo
et al., 2001)13
13 The assumption of friction in the boat movements because of institutional reasons, implies that δ is
suﬃciently low to sustain the spatial pattern.
12a11DE + a22Dx > 2(a11a22 − a12a21)
1/2 (DEDx)
1/2 > 0 (32)
Assuming that this condition is satisﬁed at the spatially homogeneous steady state, then
























where λ are the positive solutions of the quadratic (30), n1 is the smallest integer greater or
equal to ak1/π and n2 is the largest integer less than or equal to ak2/π. The wavenumbers k1



























To obtain an idea of the solution described by (33), we follow Murray (2003) and assume






is such there exists only one corresponding
n =1 , then the only unstable mode is cos(πz/a) and

















The solution for the biomass and eﬀort assuming small positive C1 =( εx,ε E)
0
take the form































> 0, as t increases the deviation from the spatial homogeneous solution does not
die out and could eventually be transformed into a spatial pattern which is like a single cosine
mode. If the domain is suﬃciently large to include a larger number of unstable wavenumbers
then the spatial pattern is more complex. With exponentially growing solutions for all time
for (35) and (36), then x →∞and E →∞as t →∞would be implied. However it is
assumed that the linear unstable eigenfunctions are bounded by the nonlinear terms and
13that a spatially heterogeneous steady state will emerge. The main assumption here is the
existence of a bounding domain for the kinetics of (17) and (18) in the positive quadrant
(Murray, 2003, Vol II p. 87). Thus the bounding set that constrains the kinetics will also
contain the solutions (35) and (36) when diﬀusion is present. Then the growing solution
approaches, as t →∞ , a cosine like spatial pattern, which implies spatial heterogeneity of
the steady state. Figure 4, draws on Murray (2003 Vol II, pp. 94-95) to represent one possible
spatial pattern for x(z,t). Shaded areas represent spatial biomass concentration above x∗,
while non shaded areas represent spatial biomass concentration below x∗.
[Figure 3]
The interactions between eﬀort and biomass are shown in ﬁgure 5. Assume that eﬀort
increases and reduces biomass below the steady state x∗. This would result in a ﬂux of
biomass from neighboring regions which would reduce the eﬀort in these regions, causing ﬁsh
biomass to increase and so on until a spatial pattern is reached.
[Figure 4]
As we show above the reaction diﬀusion mechanism characterized by (17) and (18) might
be diﬀusionally unstable, but the solution could evolve to a spatially heterogenous steady
state deﬁned by:
xs (z),E s (z) as t →∞
Then, setting (∂x/∂t,∂E/∂t)=0in (17) and (18), we obtain that xs (z),E s (z) should
satisfy
0=x(z)(s − rx(z)) − qE(z)x(z)+Dxx
00
(z) (37)












14Then a measure of spatial heterogeneity at the steady state is given by the heterogeneity









dz ≥ 0 (40)

















(s − rx− qE)+
δE
DE
(pqx − AC (E)
¸
dz (41)
if there is no spatial patterning s−rx−qE =0and pqx−AC (E)=0 , which are the spatially
homogeneous solutions, and G =0.
2.3 Spatial Heterogeneity and Regulation
As we showed in the previous section, the adaptive biomass-eﬀort system is likely to create
spatial heterogeneity under an appropriate institutional regime inducing certain parameter
constellation. This implies, for example, that in the case presented in ﬁgures 4 and 5 the
biomass concentration, eﬀort and proﬁts will be diﬀerent at diﬀerent locations of our spa-
tial domain. This can emerge in situations where, because of institutional allocation of the
"rights to ﬁsh" which restricts boats from certain patches, ﬁsh biomass and boat movements
are compatible in speed for the Turing mechanism to create spatial patterns and potential
spatial inequalities. The measure of inequality can be given for example by the heterogeneity
function (40), then social justice would require regulation to support spatial homogeneity.
The problem then is reduced to that of ﬁnding instruments that will prevent diﬀusive insta-
bility.
As indicated in the previous section, diﬀusive instability cannot occur if the sign pattern
of the linearization matrix (25) does not show opposition of signs between a11 and a22 and
15between a12 and a21. Thus given (25), the target is to change the sign structure, through
a regulatory instrument, in a way that will prevent diﬀusive instability. An instrument
aﬀecting harvesting behavior will aﬀect proﬁts and consequently the second row of (25).
We consider feedback control instruments in the general form of a non linear tax on eﬀort
(e.g. boat size or boat numbers) or on harvesting τ (x,E), with the property that when the
tax is applied, then either a21 or a22 will change sign so that diﬀusive instability is not
supported.
Proposition 3 A spatially homogeneous non linear tax on eﬀort of the feedback form τ (E)
with τ
0




(E+) > 0, where E+ is the regulated spatially homogeneous
steady state for eﬀort, will prevent the emergence of spatial heterogeneity.
For proof see Appendix.
The eﬀect of the nonlinear tax on eﬀort is to shift the average cost curve, or equivalently
the x| ˙ E=0 curve so that the intersection with the x|˙ x=0 curve, takes place at the increasing
part of the average cost curve as shown in Figure 3, where the new curve is ACreg.
A feedback tax on harvesting can also be used as a regulatory instrument.
Proposition 4 A spatially homogeneous non linear tax on harvesting of the feedback form
τ (E,x) with p − τ (E,x) > 0 ∂τ
∂E > 0, ∂τ
∂x < 0 and
∂τ(E+,x+)
∂E qx+ + AC
0
(E+) > 0, where
(E+,x +) is the regulated spatially homogeneous steady state for eﬀort, will prevent the emer-
gence of spatial heterogeneity.
For proof see Appendix.
The eﬀect of the nonlinear tax on eﬀort is to shift the x| ˙ E=0 curve so that the intersection
with the x|˙ x=0 c u r v et a k e sp l a c ea tt h ei n c r e a s i n gp a r to ft h ea v e r a g ec o s tc u r v ea ss h o w n
in Figure 3.
It is interesting to note from these two propositions that a feedback tax on harvesting
which depends on biomass alone, that is a tax τ (x), cannot exclude diﬀusive instability,
because in this case the a21 element is positive, but the a22 element is now −δE+AC
0
(E+).
Thus intersections at the decreasing part of the average cost curve cannot be excluded.
16On the other hand consider the introduction of a new technology, say because of subsi-
dization, that increases the catchability coeﬃcient q, and assume that with the old technology
the x|˙ x=0 isocine was intersecting the x| ˙ E=0 at the increasing part of the average cost curve,
point S in ﬁgure 2, so that diﬀusive instability was not possible. The increase in q rotates
the x|˙ x=0 isocine towards the origin so that the new steady state could take place at the de-
creasing part of the average cost curve. Then, as has been shown above, diﬀusive instability
is possible. Thus,
Proposition 5 In the model of biomass and eﬀort diﬀusion described above, an increase in
the catchability coeﬃcient might generate spatial hererogeneity.
3 On the Optimal Control of Diﬀusion: An Extension of Pon-
tryagin’s Principle
In the previous section we analyzed descriptive models of biomass eﬀort diﬀusion and ex-
amined, in the context of these models, the emergence of spatial heterogeneity through the
Turing mechanism. In this section we explicitly introduce optimization and we analyze the
eﬀects of the optimal control of diﬀusion processes in the emergence of spatial heterogeneity.



























=0 zero ﬂux (44)
The ﬁrst part of (44) provides initial conditions, while the second part is a zero ﬂux
condition similar to (19). Problem (42) to (44) has been analyzed in more general forms (e.g.
Jacques-Louis Lions, 1971). We however choose to present here an extension of Pontryagin’s
principle for this problem, because it is in the spirit of optimal control formalism used by
17economists, and thus can be used for other applications, but also because it makes the whole
analysis in the paper self contained.14 Furthermore, as noted in the introduction, the
use of Pontryagin’s principle in continuous time space allows for a drastic reduction of the
dimensionality of the dynamic system describing the phenomenon and makes the problem
tractable. Our results are presented below, with proofs in the Appendix.
Maximum Principle under diﬀusion: Necessary Conditions - Finite time hori-
zon (MPD-FT). Let u∗ = u∗ (t,z) be a choice of instrument that solves problem (42) to
(44) and let x∗ = x∗ (t,z) be the associate path for the state variable. Then there exists a
function λ(t,z) such that for each t and z
1. u∗ = u∗ (t,z) maximizes the generalized Hamiltonian function




























evaluated at u∗ = u∗ (x(t,z),λ(t,z)).








The result can also be extended to inﬁnite time horizon problems with discounting. In
14 Similar conditions have been derived for other cases such as the control of parabolic equations (Jean-Pierr
Raymond and Housmaa Zidani.1998,1999), boundary control (Lenhart et al. 1999), or distributed parameter
control (Dean Carlson et al. 1991; Lenhart and Bhat 1992)
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z1
=0 zero ﬂux (50)
Maximum Principle under diﬀusion: Necessary Conditions - Inﬁnite time
horizon (MPD-IT).L e tu∗ = u∗ (t,z) be a choice of instrument that solves problem (42)
to (44) and let x∗ = x∗ (t,z) be the associate path for the state variable. Then there exists a
function λ(t,z) such that for each t and z
















∂z2 = ρλ −
µ










evaluated at u∗ = u∗ (x(t,z),λ(t,z))







It is clear that the pair of (46) or (52) can characterize the whole dynamic system in
continuous time space. Conditions (45) - (47) are essentially necessary conditions. Suﬃciency
conditions can also be derived by extending suﬃciency theorems of optimal control. Proofs
are provided in the Appendix.
19Maximum Principle under diﬀusion: Suﬃcient conditions - Finite time hori-
zon
Assume that functions f (x,u) and g(x,u) are concave diﬀerentiable functions for prob-
lem (42) to (44) and suppose that functions x∗ (t,z),u ∗ (t,z) and λ(t,z) satisfy necessary
conditions (45) - (47) and (43) for all t ∈ [t0,t 1],z∈ [z0,z 1] and that x(t,z) and λ(t,z)
are continuous with
λ(t,z) ≥ 0 for all t and z (55)
Then the functions x∗ (t,z),u ∗ (t,z) solve the problem (42) to (44). That is the necessary
conditions (45) - (47) are also suﬃcient.
The result can also be extended along the lines of Arrow’s suﬃciency theorem. We state
here the inﬁnite horizon case.
Maximum Principle under diﬀusion: Suﬃcient conditions - Inﬁnite time hori-
zon
Let H0 denote the maximized Hamiltonian, or
H0 (x,λ)=m a x
u
H(x,u,λ) (56)
If the maximized Hamiltonian is a concave function of x for given λ then functions x∗ (t,z),




e−ρtλ(t,z) ≥ 0, lim
t→∞
e−ρtλ(t,z)x(t,z)=0 (57)
solve the problem (42) to (44).
3.1 Optimal Harvesting under Biomass Diﬀusion
Having established the optimality conditions, we are interested in the implications of diﬀusion
on optimally controlled systems regarding mainly the possibility of emergence of spatial
20heterogeneity under optimal control, but also the possibility of diﬀusion acting as a stabilizing
force for unstable steady states under optimal control. Let as before x(z,t) denote the
concentration of the biomass of a renewable resource (e.g. ﬁs h )a ts p a t i a lp o i n tz ∈ Z, at







a =0 . Biomass grows according to a standard growth function F (x) and
disperses in space with a constant diﬀusion coeﬃcient D, or
∂x(z,t)
∂t
= F (x(z,t)) − H (z,t)+D∇2x (58)
where harvesting H (z,t) of the resource is determined as H (z,t)=qx(z,t)E (z,t),E(z,t)
denotes the concentration of harvesting eﬀort (e.g. boats) at spatial point z and time t, and
q is catchability coeﬃcient. The total cost of applying eﬀort E (z,t) at location z is given by
an increasing and convex function c(E (z,t),z), so if we apply the eﬀort further from the
origin, cost increases. Let beneﬁts from harvesting at each point on space be S (H (z,t)).











= F (x(t,z)) − qx(t,z)E (t,z)+D
∂x2 (t,z)
∂z2
x(0,z) given, and zero ﬂux on 0,a
Following the section above, MPD-IT implies that the optimal control maximizes the gener-
alized Hamiltonian for each location z,
H = S (H (z,t)) − c(E (z,t),z)+ (60)
µ(t,z)
·










= p(z)qx(z) − c
0
(E (z)) − µ(z)qx(z) ⇒ (p − µ)qx = c
0
(E) (61)












00 < 0 for all z.
Then, the Hamiltonian system becomes:
∂x
∂t
= F (x) − qxE(x,µ)+D
∂x2











µ − pqE (x,µ) − D
∂µ2
∂z2 = G2 (x,µ) − D
∂µ2
∂z2 (63)
A spatially homogeneous (or "ﬂat") system is deﬁned from (62) and (63) for D =0 . A" ﬂat"
steady state (x∗,µ ∗) for this system is determined as the solution of ∂x
∂t =
∂µ
∂t =0 .15 Given
the nonlinear nature of (62) and (63), more then one steady state is expected. Assume that
such a steady state with (x∗,µ ∗) > 0,E 0 > 0 exists, and consider the linearization matrix





G1x (x∗,µ ∗) G1µ (x∗,µ ∗)






(x∗) − qx∗E (x∗,µ ∗) − qx∗ ∂E(x∗,µ∗)
∂x













G2µ = ρ − F
0
(x∗)+qx∗E + qx∗ ∂E(x∗,µ∗)
∂x = ρ − G1x
(65)
For the ﬂa ts t e a d ys t a t ew eh a v et r J = G1x + G2µ = ρ>0. Therefore if detJ>0
the steady state is unstable, while if detJ<0 the steady state has the local saddle point
property. In the saddle point case there is a one-dimensional manifold such that for any
15 See, for example, Clark (1990) for the analysis of this problem.
22initial value of µ there is an initial value for x, such that the system converges to the steady
state along the manifold.
To analyze the impact of diﬀusion we follow section 2.2. We have, for the linearization
of the full system (62) and (63):


























and λ must solve
¯ ¯ ¯λI − J − ˜ Dk2
¯ ¯ ¯ =0
Then the eigenvalue λ(k) as a function of the wavenumber is obtained as the roots of







= −D2k4 − D[2G1x (x∗,µ ∗) − ρ]k2 +d e tJ (68)

























. We examine the implication of diﬀu s i o ni nt w oc a s e s
3.1.1 Case I: The Spatially homogeneous steady state is a saddle point λ2 < 0 <
λ1 for k2 =0-D i ﬀusion generates spatial heterogeneity.
In this case detJ<0 and since furthermore trJ>0 there is a one-dimensional stable
manifold with negative slope. On this manifold and in the neighborhood of the steady state,
for any initial value of x there is an initial value of µ such that the spatially homogeneous
system converges to the ﬂat steady state (x∗,µ ∗). For the optimally-controlled system the







 ∼ C2v2eλ2t ,for all z (70)
where C2 is constant determined by initial conditions and v2 is the eigenvector corresponding
to λ2.16 The path for the optimal control E is given by ˆ E0 = E (ˆ x(z,t), ˆ µ(z,t)) for all z.










1. If 0 <h
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>ρ 2/4, for some k, then both roots are complex with positive real parts.




> 0 for some k, then the Hamiltonian system is unstable, in the neigh-




is concave, and therefore has a maximum. Furthermore h(0) = detJ<017 and
h
0













=0 , or k2
max = −
[2G1x (x∗,µ ∗) − ρ]
2D






> 0 or −D2k4
max −D[2G1x (x∗,µ ∗) − ρ]k2
max +detJ>0, there exist two positive
roots k2
1 <k 2
2 such that h
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k2¢










This is the dispersion relationship associated with the optimal control problem.18
[Figure 5]
16 Since we want the controlled system to converge to the optimal steady state, the constant C1 associated
w i t ht h ep o s i t i v er o o tλ1 i ss e ta tz e r o .
17 This is because the ﬂat steady state has the saddle point property.
18 For a detailed analysis of the dispersion relationship in problems without optimization, see Murray,
(2003).
24When diﬀusion renders both roots positive, diﬀusive instability emerges in the optimal
control problem, in a way similar to the diﬀusive instability emerging from the Turing mecha-
nism in systems without optimization. In this case the solution (70) for the controlled system
becomes, following section 2.2,









































i st h er o o tt h a ti sp o s i t i v ed u et od i ﬀusion, n1 is the smallest integer greater
than or equal to ak2
1/π, and n2 is the largest integer less than or equal to ak2
2/π. The path
for optimal eﬀort will be E0 (z,t)=E (ˆ x(z,t), ˆ µ(z,t)). Since λ2 > 0 the spatial patterns do
not decay as t increases. Thus, provided that the kinetics of the Hamiltonian system have
ac o n ﬁned set, the solution converges at the steady state to a spatial pattern. This implies
that for a subset of the spatial domain the resource stock and its shadow value are above
the ﬂat steady state levels and for another subset they are below the ﬂat steady state levels,
similar to ﬁgures 3 or 4. This result can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 For an optimal harvesting system which exhibits a saddle point property in
the absence of diﬀusion, it is optimal, under biomass diﬀusion and for a certain set parameter
values, to have emergence of diﬀusive instability leading to a spatially heterogeneous steady
state for the biomass stock, its shadow value and the corresponding optimal harvesting eﬀort.
The signiﬁcance of this proposition, which extends the concept of the Turing mechanism
to the optimal control of diﬀusion, is that spatial heterogeneity and pattern formation, re-
sulting from diﬀusive instability, might be an optimal outcome under certain circumstances.
For regulation purposes and for the harvesting problem examined above, it is clear that
the spatially heterogeneous steady state shadow value of the resource stock, and the corre-
sponding harvesting eﬀort, can be used to deﬁne optimal regional fees or quotas.
253.1.2 Case II: The Spatially homogeneous steady state is unstable Reλ1,2 > 0
for k2 =0-D i ﬀusion Stabilizes
Since trJ>0, this implies that detJ>0. Let ∆D = ρ2 − 4detJ>0 s ot h ew eh a v et w o
positive real roots at the ﬂat steady state. Diﬀusion can stabilize the system in the sense of






The quadratic function (68) is concave, and therefore has a maximum. Furthermore h(0) =
detJ>0 and h
0
(0) = −(2G1x − ρ) > 0 if the steady state is on the declining part of F (x),
or F
0
(x∗) < 0. Thus there is a root k2
2 > 0 (see ﬁgure 5b) such that for k2 >k 2
2,w eh a v e
λ2 < 0. The solutions for x(z,t) and µ(z,t), will be determined by the sum of exponentials
of λ1 and λ2. Since we want to stabilize the system we set the constant associated with the
positive root λ1 equal to zero. Then the solution will depend on the sum of unstable and
















































where n2 is the smallest integer greater or equal to ak2
2/π and N>n 2 and we choose optimal





< 0 for n>n 2, all the modes
of the third term of (76) decay exponentially. So to converge to the steady state we need to
set Cˆ n =0 , then the spatial patterns corresponding to the third term of (76) will die out
with the passage of time and the system will converge to the spatially homogeneous steady
state.
26This result can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 For an unstable steady state, in the absence of diﬀusion, of an optimal har-
vesting problem, it is optimal, under biomass diﬀusion and for a certain set of parameter
values, to stabilize the steady state. Stabilization is in the form of saddle point stability
where spatial patterns decay and the system converges along one direction to the previously
unstable spatially homogeneous steady state.
The signiﬁcance of this proposition is that it shows that under diﬀusion it is optimal to
stabilize a steady state which was unstable under spatial homogeneity.
3.2 On the Optimal Control of Bioinvasions
The framework of the optimization methodology developed in section 3 can be applied to the
study of bioinvasion problems which typically involve, along with the temporal dynamics,
diﬀusion in space of an invasive species (e.g. insects). Let the evolution of the biomass of
t h ei n v a s i v es p e c i e sg i v e nb yt h ed i ﬀusion equation
∂x(z,t)
∂t
= F(x(z,t),a) − h(z,t)+D∇2x (77)
where x(0,0) = x0 denotes the "propagule" of the invasive species which is released at time
t =0at the origin of a one-dimensional space Z. The biological growth function of the
invasive species is given by F(x(z,t),a), with a reﬂecting general environmental interaction
with the species in question, and h(z,t) denoting the removal (harvesting) of the invasive
species, through for example spraying.
Let c1 (z)h(z,t) b et h ec o s to fr e m o v i n gh(z,t) from the invasive species at time t and
location z, thus c1 (z) is the site dependent unit removal cost, and c2 (x(z,t),z) the cost or
damage associated with the amount of biomass x(z,t) from the invasive species at time t
and site z. This cost could be, for example, losses in agricultural production, or treatment
cost of those aﬀected by the invasive species.
The bioinvasion control problem for a regulator would be to choose a removal policy
{h(z,t)} in space/time to minimize the present value of removal and harvesting costs. The







e−ρt [c1 (z)h(z,t)+c2 (x(z,t),z)]dtdz (78)
s.t. (77) and x(0,0) = x0 (79)
We exploit the linearity of the objective function and the species dynamics in h to develop
a MRAP for the optimal control of diﬀusions with a linear structure in the control. The
MRAP essentially determines an optimal or target invasive species biomass, x∗ (z) ≥ 0 in
the following way.
Proposition 8 The optimal target biomass x∗ (z) ≥ 0 of the invasive species for any t ∈





∂z ,19 is determined as
x∗ (z)=a r gm i n{c1 (z)[F (x(z),a) − ρx(z)] + c2 (x(z),z)} (80)
For proof see Appendix.
Objective (80) is now written in MRAP form which is in the form of a sum of independent
terms across space and time which suggests that the optimal thing to do is to approach as
rapidly as possible, for each site z, the desired "target" x∗(z) described by optimization (80).
If we assume that the objective function in (80) is convex in x for all z in Z, then we can
derive some concrete results.
First, it will be optimal to ﬁght an initial bioinvasion, described by x0(z), as much as
possible, if x∗(z)=0for all z, when (81) below holds,
c1(z)(F0(0,a) − ρ)+c0
2(0,z) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ Z (81)
With the objective (80) convex in x for each z, condition (81) is suﬃcient for "ﬁghting to
the max" to be optimal. Condition (81) is easy to interpret. Assume to simplify things that
19 This assumption covers the zero ﬂux condition used earlier in this paper.
28F(x,z)=xs(z), then condition (81) is
c0
2(0,z)/[ρ − s(z)] ≥ c1(z), ∀z ∈ Z (82)
which says that you "ﬁght to the max" the bioinvasion, when the capitalized sum of marginal
damages from the biomass of the invasive species (adjusted for the growth rate of the species)
is greater than the cost of killing one.
Secondly, it is optimal to do nothing if
c0
2(k(z),z)/[ρ − s(z)] ≤ c1(z), ∀z ∈ Z (83)
where k(z) is the carrying capacity of the invasive species at site z. Equation (83) makes
sense from the economic point of view. If c2(x) is convex, marginal damage is increasing in
x. Hence, if the largest possible marginal damage is still not enough when capitalized (at
the rate adjusted for growth) to cover the current marginal cost of removing one unit of x,
it makes sense that it would be optimal to do nothing in the face of bioinvasion.
Third, it is easy to locate the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an interior solution
to be optimal, given the assumed convexity of the objective function in (80). The optimality
condition for the interior solution, x∗ (z), will be
c1(z)(F0(x∗ (z),a) − ρ)+c
0
2(x∗ (z),z) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ Z (84)




      
      
0 if x(z) <x ∗ (z)
hmax if x(z) >x ∗ (z)
F (x∗ (z),a) − D∇2x∗ (z) if x(z)=x∗ (z)
(85)
Conditions (85) represent an extension of the standard MRAP solution to continuous time
space.
294 Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research
This paper develops methods of control of spatial dynamical systems. In particular it adapts
Turing analysis for diﬀusive instability to bioeconomic problems, and it furthermore extends
this analysis to recursive optimal control frameworks. It applies the methods to economic
problems of optimal harvesting and optimal control of bioinvasions as illustrations of the
potential power of the methods.
In section two of the paper, we formulate a spatial harvesting model in continuous space-
time of the Clark (1990), Sanchirico and Wilen (1999, 2001) type, in order to illustrate how
the interaction of the Turing mechanism with economic forces can produce travelling wave
solutions and spatial heterogeneity in an analytically tractible descriptive framework. We
show how this framework could be used to study the interaction of various tax and regulatory
policies with the economic dynamics and the biomass dynamics over space-time to produce
or to moderate emergent spatial heterogeneity. We use this framework to expose the key role
of the dispersion relation in the study of emergent spatial heterogeneity. In section three
of the paper, we develop a version of the Pontryagin Maximum Principle for continuous
space-time problems that should be useful to economists. While this is not entirely new,
we believe the tractible and transparent way in which we develop it should be useful to our
fellow economists and other researchers.
We illustrate its usefulness by applying the method to an optimal version of the descriptive
problem in section two. We develop the analog of the dispersion relationship for a recursive
inﬁnite horizon version of the optimal harvesting problem, and show how one can now easily
do local stability analysis by linearization of the analog of the familiar Hamiltonian. We
extend the theory associated with the dispersion relationship in descriptive spatial Turing
analysis to our recursive inﬁnite horizon optimization framework. This is an extension to
30continuous space-time of the economist’s familiar inﬁnite horizon framework. We believe this
extension of the dispersion relation and Turing analysis is new. In any event it should be
useful for many applications involving optimization over space-time in economics and related
subjects.
We locate suﬃcient conditions for diﬀusion and optimization to induce local instability
and, hence, spatial heterogeneity in an originally spatially-homogeneous situation. We also
locate suﬃcient conditions for diﬀusion and optimization to stabilize and to homogenize an
originally spatially-heterogeneous situation.
In addition we show how the optimization framework can be easily modiﬁed to ana-
lyze "bang-bang" problems which are linear in the control, e.g. MRAP. We illustrate the
potential usefulness of this modiﬁcation to the optimal control of bioinvasions. We give sim-
ple, economically-interpretable suﬃcient conditions for the optimality of various bioinvasion
ﬁghting strategies such as "ﬁghting to the max."
We believe that the analytical methods developed in this paper not only provide some
useful insights on the optimal control in time-space of some important bioeconomic problems,
such as ﬁshery management and control of bioinvasions, but that they can also provide a
solid basis for the analysis of a variety of economics problems where spatial considerations
are important.
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Thus under the eﬀort tax s
0
,c min in (12) and K increase, while under the harvesting tax
only r
0
declines and thus K increases. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :Under the tax the evolution of eﬀort for the spatially homoge-
neous system is described by
˙ E = δE(pqx − τ (E) − AC (E))



















































It is clear that tr (J+) < 0 and Det(J+) > 0 so the regulated steady state is stable and
because of the sign order at the steady state no diﬀusive instability is possible.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :Under the tax the evolution of eﬀort for the spatially homoge-
neous system is described by
˙ E = δE(pqx − τ (x,E)qx− AC (E)) (89)








x| ˙ E=0 =
τ (E)+AC (E)
(p − τ (x,E))q
(91)




























It is clear that tr (J+) < 0 and Det(J+) > 0 so the regulated steady state is stable and
because of the sign order at the steady state no diﬀusive instability is possible. ¥
Extension of Pontryagin’s Principle: Necessary conditions
We develop a variational argument along the lines of Morton Kamien and Nancy Schwartz

























































































dt by zero ﬂux (94)




































































We consider a one parameter family of comparison controls u∗ (t,z)+εη(t,z), where u∗ (t,z)
is the optimal control, η(t,z) is a ﬁxed function and ε is a small parameter. Let y(t,z,ε),
t ∈ [t0,t 1],z[z0,z 1] be the state variable generated by (43) and (44) with control u∗ (t,z)+
εη(t,z),t∈ [t0,t 1],z∈ [z0,z 1]. We assume that y(t,z,ε) is a smooth function of all its
arguments and the ε enters parametrically. For ε =0we have the optimal path x∗ (t,z),
furthermore all comparison paths must satisfy initial and zero ﬂux conditions. Thus,













When the functions u∗,x ∗ and η are held ﬁxed the value of (42) evaluated along the control
function u∗ (t,z)+εη (t,z) and the corresponding state function y(t,z,ε) depends only on













[f (y(t,z,ε),u ∗ (t,z)+εη(t,z))




































































Using the usual transversality condition on λ,w eh a v et h a tλ(t1)=0 ,f u r t h e r m o r e














fu + λgu =0 (102)








then by (102) optimality conditions become conditions (45) - (47). The inﬁnite horizon case
with discounting is obtained by following Kenneth Arrow and Mordecai Kurz (1970, Chapter
II.6). ¥
35Extension of Pontryagin’s Principle: Suﬃciency
Suppose that x∗,u ∗,λsatisfy conditions (45) - (47) and (43) and let x, u functions
satisfying (43). Let f∗,g∗ denote functions evaluated along (x∗,u ∗) and let f,g denote






(f∗ − f)dtdz ≥ 0 (104)
From the concavity of f it follows that
f∗ − f ≥ (x∗ − x)f∗




































λ[g∗ − g − (x∗ − x)g∗
x − (u∗ − u)]g∗
udtdz ≥ 0 (108)
Condition (107) follows from (106) by using conditions (45) and (46) to substitute for f∗
x
and f∗
u. Condition (108) is derived by integrating ﬁrst by parts the terms involving ∂λ
∂t,
substituting for ∂x
∂t from (43), and using the transversality conditions, as has been done in
(93), then by integrating twice the terms involving ∂2λ
∂z2 and using the zero ﬂux condition as
has been done in (95). The non-negativity of the integral in (108) follows from (55) and the
concavity of g.
The result can be easily extended along the lines of Arrow’s suﬃciency theorem (Arrow
and Kurz, 1970, Chapter II.6). ¥
Proof of Proposition 8: Substitute h from (77) to (78) and then integrate by parts to
eliminate the dx/dt term. For this term we obtain
Z ∞
0
{dx/dtexp(−ρt)}dt =l i m
T→∞




36where the "admissible" class of x(t,z) is such that
lim
T→∞
x(T)exp(−ρT)=0∀z ∈ Z (110)
Integrating the term, D∂2x






















where "bdry(Z)" denotes the "boundary of Z". If Z is, for example, a circle [0,2π] where








∂z and (111) is zero. Thus, for this special case,
the diﬀusion term vanishes in the objective (78). This will be true for any space Z where
we assume that the values of the derivatives ∂x
∂z are equal at the boundaries. If Z is the









Thus, collecting all this together we may write the objective as
TC(0) =
ZZ
{exp(−ρt){c1(z)[F(x,z) − ρx]+c2(x,z)}dzdt +
Z
{c1(z)x0(z)}.dz (112)
J(x,z):= {c1(z)[F(x,a) − ρx]+c2(x,z)} (113)
Once we get (113) we can optimize "term by term" to obtain (80). ¥
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